ACADEMY OF DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT – INSTITUTE OF SKY POLITICS

Russia and the PRC can be linked via the Ob and Irtysh rivers

Understanding of meanings is achieved not by the logic of convictions, but only by comparison with another. Such an "other" is the trans-Siberian transport route North – South capable of linking China through Kazakhstan and Russia along the Irtysh and Ob rivers with the world ocean. 

The source of the Irtysh is in the mountains of the Mongolian Altai. Through China the river flows for 525 km under the name Black Irtysh. Further down in Kazakhstan, from Lake Zaisan, it is already the Irtysh proper. On the territory of Russia the Irtysh flows into the Ob river. From the source to the Ob Gulf of the Kara Sea it is only 5,410 km.

The Siberian river route along the North–South longitude intersects with the latitudinal Northern Sea Route West–East in the Ob Gulf. Here are located the main liquefied natural gas production facilities: Yamal LNG (capacity 16.5 million tonnes per year, based on the port of Sabetta) and Arctic LNG-2 (design capacity 19.8 million tonnes).

In the investment projects of these complexes, besides the Russian Federation, energy companies from France, the PRC, and Japan initially participated. 

As a result of anti-Russian sanctions, the participation of foreign shareholders has been suspended, and the Arctic LNG-2 project is idle.

The export of products from the Ob Gulf is carried out by ice-class gas carrier tankers (independently at ice thickness up to 1.4 m) and with icebreaker escort (now behind nuclear icebreakers of the "Arktika" type at ice thickness up to 2.8 m). 

Year-round navigation is possible only to Europe in the Western sector of the Northern Sea Route, to which the Kara Sea belongs. 

Navigation along the "eastern route" is carried out for 3 months, from August to November. Navigation in the winter-spring period requires breaking through pack ice 4–6 metres thick, which in the shallow waters of the Laptev Sea come right up to the New Siberian Islands and the islands of Severnaya Zemlya. But icebreakers of the "Leader" type – capable of overcoming ice up to 4.3 m thick – will not appear before 2028. However, even then the cost of logistics there will be enormous.

Navigation along the NSR is limited by climate and hydrography: climate is not only the months of navigational polar night, cold and ice thickness, but also dense fogs with wave heights of 7 metres in open water; hydrography, in turn, is the shallow waters of the straits.

The NSR does not have a single and fixed route. The path retains a general direction, but "migrates" along geographic latitude between the continental coast and the North Pole depending on the constantly changing ice situation.

Perennial pack ice does not allow a route to be laid north of the Russian islands — even if convoys of ships "pop out" beyond the limits of the Russian Federation's territorial waters, they inevitably have to return inside in order to pass through the straits. Perennial ice is far thicker and stronger than first-year ice, which is only 1.0–1.5 m, whereas perennial ice is up to 4 m level, and up to 6 metres hummocked pack ice. 

From the point of view of navigation, the most serious limitation on the NSR is the New Siberian Islands. Here the depth of the Sannikov Strait allows the passage of ships with a draught of no more than 11.6 metres. Moreover, the bottom of this strait is constantly being washed over by sea currents, so constant hydrographic surveying is needed, which so far does not exist. On the traditional route all shoals and sandbanks are precisely charted, but here there is no bottom chart. And the shifting ice field also forces deviations from the route to goodness knows where.

Even less depth, only 11 metres, in the Dmitry Laptev Strait, which connects the East Siberian Sea and the Laptev Sea between the continental coast and Bolshoy Lyakhovsky Island.  

The draught of large container ships of the "Suezmax" class is 16 metres. And the depths even when bypassing the New Siberian Islands are 13 m, that is, large container ships cannot pass along the NSR. 

And if the depths of the straits were quite sufficient for the passage of Liberty-type ships with a displacement of 14 thousand tonnes and a draught of 8.5 m, then for super-container ships with a capacity of 23 thousand containers, supertankers and bulkers with a draught of 16 metres the NSR in the straits is impassable. And even for container ships of 13 thousand containers with a draught of 12.5 m – it is still impassable. Only for moderate container ships of 6 thousand containers is it still possible to pass. In reality, Chinese ships of 400 containers pass along the NSR. The working draught of Russian nuclear icebreakers – 9 metres – serves as a reference point.

Plus the prolonged waiting for an icebreaker by carriers while a convoy is assembled (2–4 vessels, no more) negates the advantages of the NSR as the shortest and fastest route between Europe and Asia. Along the NSR, only 30–40 foreign ships pass per year, whereas along the Suez Canal – as many as 18 thousand (18000).

That is why the water route for exporting LNG and other resources of the north up the rivers to the south into the PRC acts as an alternative to the harsh conditions of navigation along the seas of the Arctic Ocean.

Back in the 19th century this cheapest mode of transport was used to transport ore from China to Russia. Now in China a railway line reaches the city of Beitun on the Black Irtysh. That is, there is an opportunity to supplement the "Belt and Road" initiative with a northern route leading into Central Asia, Russia and further along the Northern Sea Route to Northern Europe (see the diagram in the header).

For comparison, in terms of cargo base along the latitudinal Trans-Caspian transport route between China and Kazakhstan, 23–27 million tonnes of export cargo are transported per year.

As for domestic transportation, in Soviet times—the 1970s–1980s—river transport carried up to 11 million tonnes of cargo along the Irtysh. Today, navigation between the PRC and the Russian Federation within Kazakhstan has fallen into decline. However, the infrastructure of shore facilities, wharves, and berths has been preserved, and the locks are operational.

General navigation conditions along the Irtysh and Ob rivers:

The ice-free season of economic activity on the Ob–Irtysh route lasts a little more than half a year, from April to November, which is twice the duration of navigation along the Northern Sea Route.

In the upper reaches the water freezes at the end of November, in the lower reaches—at the beginning of November. The average ice thickness varies from 65 to 100 cm; in the lower reaches of the Ob it reaches a maximum of 130 cm. The average number of days with ice cover is 161–176. The ice drift lasts 3–8 days. In Kazakhstan there are three hydroelectric dams with locks on the Irtysh.

Regular navigation is now organized only on the route below the Ust-Kamenogorsk hydroelectric power station in Kazakhstan to the Ob Gulf.

However, in places, due to shallows at the riffles, navigation on the Irtysh has become quite problematic (guaranteed depths of only 140–180 cm). That is, serious dredging work is needed on the Irtysh; the fairway must be cleared and the passage areas for vessels with a displacement of up to 3 thousand tonnes must be marked. 

The route of the cheapest river transport across Western Siberia will connect millions of people. In the Irtysh basin are located major industrial cities of China—Fuyun and Burqin; of Kazakhstan—Ust-Kamenogorsk, Semey, Kurchatov, Aksu, Pavlodar; of Russia—Omsk, Tara, Tobolsk, Khanty-Mansiysk. 

The main point is obvious: the return of international navigation to the Irtysh is not merely a transit transport project, but a strategic initiative, capable of changing the economic landscape of the region, turning it into a key trade, scientific and cultural hub of Central Asia and Western Siberia. 

The global project is easily capable of raising and realizing the potential of the northern river route of the shared destiny of China, Kazakhstan and Russia: Greater Eurasia – the Third Horde. After all, the construction of even hundreds of river tankers, dry-cargo vessels, container ships and a dozen river icebreakers is not a "black hole" of expenditure on giants of the icebreaker fleet such as the "Leader" and the economic development of the lifeless icy desert of the Arctic.

The hidden aspect of the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone adopted in the Russian Federation in 2013, with a program to open the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for regular navigation in the routes and logistics of world trade until 2035, boils down to the following:

  • by 2026, in the North of the Russian Federation, modest measures of pinpoint force cover for the NSR had been implemented, but instead a broad propaganda campaign was launched about the benefits of developing the resources of the North (with an estimated value of 30 trillion USD, of which ⅔ are energy resources).
  • to designate the flow of goods along the entire NSR, the government of the Russian Federation in October 2019 adopted a resolution on the creation of a state operator of container cargo on the NSR with risk insurance and additional payment to clients of the difference in the price of transportation along the NSR and via the Suez (which is 40%) for 10 years at the expense of the budget of the Russian Federation.
  • the resources of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation in the eastern section cannot be extracted profitably without new technologies (a barrel of oil costs 150 USD), and therefore 30% of the world's gas reserves and 13% of oil since 2022 have become collateral for Russia's share in the global trust of the new currency world.

With the current reserves of oil and gas in warm countries, the raw materials and fuel of the Arctic are not needed.

That is why the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline to Germany was blown up on 26.09.2022, the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline exists only on paper, and the construction of ice-class gas carriers and nuclear icebreakers is being blocked. On 24.12.24, the Russian Ministry of Defense vessel Ursa Major, carrying 45-ton nuclear reactor covers for icebreakers of Project 10510 "Leader," sank as a result of a terrorist attack not far from Spain.

Here too lies the hidden reason for the US policy of quietly blocking the flow of goods along the Northern Sea Route and gaining control of its exits to the west along Greenland and to the east along Alaska.

Executed by Andrey Devyatov No1093-2 of 10.02.26